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In Barlow Clowes v. Vaughan, 1 the Court of Appeal reluctantly accepted that
the rule in Clayton's case 2 remained generally applicable to competing claims
in equity, to mixed funds in running bank accounts. This first-in first-out rule
operates rather like a bus queue, attributing successive payments out of an
account to the earliest payment in. The effect of this is that if money is
dissipated from the account, Clayton's case benefits later payments in, whereas
if money from the account is committed to an investment which increases in
value, the rule benefits earlier payments in. In both cases, a great deal can turn
capriciously on the chance order of payments. It is perhaps not surprising,
therefore, that neither in Barlow Clowes, nor indeed in any other case, has the
rule been wholeheartedly embraced. Indeed, in Barlow Clowes itself, there was
a strong entreaty to the House of Lords to reconsider the rule. 3
The purpose of this article is to advance suggestions as to how the law should
rationally develop, if ever the House should have this opportunity. It will be
suggested that the North American Rolling Charge, which has not generally
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•• Cardiff Law School.
1 [1992] 4 All E.R. 22, [1992] B.C.L.C. 910.
2 (1816) 1Mer. 572, [1814-23] All E.R. Rep.!, 35 E.R. 781.
3 Supra.n.1 per WoolfL.J. at 39a: " ...short of the House of Lords, it is settled law that
the rule in Clayton's Case can be applied to determine the extent to which, as between each other,
equally innocent claimants are entitled in equity to moneys which have been paid into a bank
account and then subject to the movements within that account." This is an unenthusiastic
statement ofWoolfL.J.'s view of the existing law. Nor is Leggatt L.J.'s acceptance of the
application of Clayton's case overwhelming at 43b: "During the 175 years since the rule in
Clayton's Case was devised neither its acclaim nor its application has been universal."
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been greeted with enthusiasm by courts in the United Kingdom, 4 should have a
significant role to play. Even in the absence of reconsideration of Clayton's
case by the House, the extent to which, if at all, present authorities constrain
such suggestions, will be questioned.
For the purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed that the equities
between each claim are equal. 5 The existence of an initial fiduciary
relationship, allowing tracing in equity, will be assumed. 6 There seems little
doubt that courts in the United Kingdom lean towards a pari passu approach to
distribution,7 and there are circumstances where this is the fairest approach. For
example, suppose a trustee pays £100 of Alpha's money and £200 of Beta's
into a mixed fund and then dissipates £150, leaving £150 in the account. It is
4 However, in Barlow Clowes, Leggatt L.J. observed at supra.n.1 at 44c: "As between
beneficiaries to whom money in an account belongs, they should share loss in proportion to their
interest in the account immediately before each withdrawal. The fairness of that course is
obvious. It is exemplified by the judgment of the court in Re Ontario Securities Commission v.
Greymac Credit Corp.(1986) 55 O.R. (2d) 673. But if, as here, that calculation is too difficult
or expensive, the beneficiaries should in my judgment share rateably." This is a clear
endorsement of the rolling charge in any case where calculation is not too difficult or expensive.
5 In other words, excluding the situation in cases such as Re Hallet's Estate (1880) 13
Ch.D. 696, where the mixing was done by a trustee. Re Diplock [1949] Ch. 465 is authority that
Re Hallett's Estate does not apply where funds are mixed with those of a volunteer. In
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington L.B.c. [1996] 2 All E.R. 961 at 987, Lord
Browne-Wilkinson's reductio ad absurdum involving T, RI and R2, depends on Re Hallett's
Estate applying to R2, who is a volunteer, but this in tum depends on the bank's argument being
correct, a proposition which all their Lordships rejected, although a minority would have held
in the bank's favour on another issue.
6 A requirement restated by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche ibid. at 996e.
7 The House of Lords had to strain to reach this result in Sinclair v. Brougham [1914]
A.C. 398 where the shareholders and depositors could be regarded as equally innocent or equally
guilty: e.g. at 451-452 per Lord Sumner, who observed that although few if any suspected that
the banking business was ultra vires, all had notice of the rules, and so ought to have known.
Either way, the equities between them were equal. See also Barlow Clowes supra. n.1 and Re
Diplock's Estate supra.n.5, except for the claims involving Dr.Bamardo's Homes and the
National Institute for the Deaf, where Clayton's case was applied: see infra.n.17 & text also
supra.n.5 at 551-554, and in the case of the National Institute forthe Deaf [1948] 2 All E.R. 429.
Though Sinclair v. Brougham was overruled in Westdeutsche supra.n.5 at 996f, this was on the
grounds that equitable tracing ought not to have been possible at all, rather than on the principles
of pari passu distribution.
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difficult to argue that any result is fairer than pari passu distribution, giving
£50 to Alpha and £100 to Beta. It would certainly be difficult to argue that a
fairer solution would depend on the order in which the moneys were deposited.
By contrast, an application of the rule in Clayton's case would benefit the later
depositor: if Alpha's money were deposited first, Alpha would obtain nothing,
whereas if Beta's money were deposited first, Beta would obtain only £50 but
Alpha would lose nothing. So here, pari passu clearly leads to a fairer
distribution than Clayton's case.
However, it by no means follows that pari passu necessarily achieves a fairer
result. Suppose that the above example is varied, in that for some time prior to
paying Beta's £200 into the mixed account, the trustee has been using the
account for depositing payments from Alpha, and that a total of £400 of
Alpha's has been paid into the account at some time. However, over the same
period the trustee has dissipated some of the money, so that only £100 remains.
Then Beta's £200 is paid in, and as before, a further £150 dissipated, leaving
£150 in the account. In this case, a pari passu distribution would give the
Alpha the benefit of the entirety of the £400, implying that he has contributed
twice as much to the fund as Beta. Thus, Alpha would get £100 and Beta only
£50. This seems unfair on Beta, who is now adversely affected by payments
into and out of the account prior to the mixing. A similar point is made by Lord
Justice Dillon in Barlow Clowes, where contrasting Clayton's case with pari
passu, he observed that pari passu operates against later investors where
money has been dissipated from the account:
"For my part, so far as fairness is concerned, I have difficulty in
seeing the fairness to a later investor ... of holding that all those
moneys must be shared pari passu by all investors early or late if
there was no common investment fund ... If the application of
Clayton's case is unfair to early investors pari passu distribution
among all seems unfair to late investors."g
If, on the other hand, the £300 which had been withdrawn prior to Beta's
deposit, had been committed to an investment now worth £600, Beta obtains a
share in the investment on pari passu principles, even though there is no
meaningful sense in which his or her money was used. Where money is
profitably invested, rather than dissipated, pari passu tends to benefit the later




By contrast, an application of the rule in Clayton's case would benefit Beta in
the first case, where as before, Alpha would obtain nothing, and benefit Alpha
in the second. Here, Alpha would get the entirety of the investment, and Beta
would only obtain the benefit of the money remaining in the account. These
solutions are not obviously any fairer than pari passu, since in neither case
does Alpha obtain any benefit from what remains in the account, although £100
remained prior to Beta's investment. So here, neither pari passu nor Clayton's
case leads to a fair solution.
A third approach, sometimes referred to as the North American Rolling
Charge, has been met with little enthusiasm by the courts, 9 but could if adopted
resolve both the above problems of the pari passu approach, without leading to
any of the unfairness of Clayton's case. Here the case in principle for the North
American Rolling Charge will be examined along with its limitations, and the
authorities for and against its adoption.
THE WORKING OF THE NORTH AMERICAN ROLLING CHARGE
The North American Rolling Charge was described by Lord Justice Woolf in
Barlow Clowes as follows:
"This solution involves treating credits to a bank account made at
different times and from different sources as a blend or cocktail
with the result that when a withdrawal is made from the account it
is treated as a withdrawal in the same proportions as the different
interests in the account (here of the investors) bear to each other at
the moment before the withdrawal is made."l0
9 E.g. in Barlow Clowes supra. n.1 at 28a-b, Dillon L.J.(at 33d) said: "The complexities
of this method would, however, in a case where there are as many depositors as in the present
case and even with the benefits of modem computer technology be so great, and the cost would
be so high, that no one has sought to urge the court to adopt it, and I would reject it as
impracticable in the present case." Woolf L.J. took a similar view at 35j, but also observed that
it is the fairest method in some situations. Dillon L.J. thought it had in any case been ruled out
by authority, having been decisively rejected in Re Diplock; Leggatt L.J. took a slightly more
favourable view of the principle.
10 Supra.n.1 at 35h. A functionally similar description can also be found in Dillon L.J.'s
judgment at 27h-28b.
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Applied to the first example above, the North American rolling charge will give
exactly the same result as pari passu. In the second example, where the money
is dissipated before Beta's money is paid in, it gives the same result as in the
first example, because all the dissipations are regarded as Alpha's, surely the
fairest solution? Where instead of being dissipated, the money is committed to
the investment which has doubled in value, the result is still the same regarding
the bank account, but Alpha also gets the benefit of the totality of the
investment. This also seems fairest, as Beta has not, in any meaningful sense,
contributed to the investment. It is also a fairer solution, in this situation, than
Clayton's case, because Alpha's money was not exhausted by the purchase of
the investment, and it is therefore reasonable that he retains an interest in the
money remaining in the account.
THE CASE IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN ROLLING
CHARGE
In spite of the reluctance of the courts in the United Kingdom to embrace the
North American Rolling Charge, it is contended that it has a number of
advantages, and will normally be the fairest method of distribution. One
advantage is that prior property rights are never disturbed by later transactions.
Later payments in do not diminish existing interests in the remaining fund, nor
do later payments in obtain the advantage of earlier investments. There is also
no distortion of existing beneficial interests in any property purchased from
proceeds from the fund.
Another justification in principle is that once moneys have lost their
identity by being mixed into an account, the proportions attributable to each
contributor can be calculated. These proportions should not change if tlle
account is later diminished, or split into more than one account. This was of the
view taken in Scott on Trusts, in a passage quoted in Re Ontario Securities
Commission v. Greymac Credit Corporation:
" ... The claimant has an equitable lien upon the mingled fund, and
when a part of the fund is withdrawn he has an equitable lien on
the part withdrawn and on the part which remains. If tlle part
which is withdrawn is dissipated so that it can no longer be traced;
the claimant still has his equitable lien on the part which remains.
So also, as we shall see, if the part which is withdrawn is preserved
and the part which remains is subsequently dissipated, the
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claimant has an equitable lien upon the part which is withdrawn. It
is impossible and unnecessary to detennine whether the claimant's
money is included in the part withdrawn or in the part which
remains. It is impossible to detennine which part is the claimant's
money, since his money has been so commingled as to lose its
identity. It is unnecessary to detennine which part is the claimant's
money, since he is entitled to an equitable lien upon both parts .
... It is true that where the part of the fund which is withdrawn is
dissipated and the balance is preserved, the claimant is certainly
entitled to payment of his claim out of the balance. The reason is
that his lien on the entire fund undoubtedly includes the balance of
the fund after a part has been withdrawn .
... The only tenable principle is that the claimant can enforce a lien
upon any part or the product of any part of the mingled fund."! I
In Re Ontario Securities, the Court of Appeal for Ontario adopted the North
American Rolling Charge in a claim involving competing interests in a fund. In
essence, this case involved the account of a trustee, (Greymac Credit
Corporation)[G.C.c.] in which was deposited funds entrusted to G.c.c. for two
beneficiaries. One beneficiary was a trio of companies, Greymac Trust
Company [G.T.c.], Crown Trust Company [C.T.C.] and Seaway Trust
Company ["the companies"], and the other was Chorny Mortgage Investor
Participants ["the participants"]. The moneys of these two separate
beneficiaries were mixed by the trustee into his account at G.T.C.
The money first mixed into the G.T.C. account belonged to the companies,
and only later did the trustee mix in money belonging to the participants. There
was also some money of the trustee's own, but on the reasoning in Re Hallett's
Estate,12 at the time when the participants' money was placed in the account, all
the other money in it belonged to the companies. Prior to this, however, there
had been other payments in of companies' money, and withdrawals, so that
more money belonging to the companies had been paid into the account than
remained at this time.
II Scott on Trusts (3rd.ed., Little Brown, 1967) at pp.3620, 3623 & 3624, quoted in Re
Ontario Securities Commission v. Greymac Credit Corporation (1986) 55 O.R. (2d.) 673 at
682a-b (Ont.C.A.).
12 Supra.n.5 (because all money withdrawn was therefore presumed to belong to the
trustee).
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The first withdrawal made by the trustee was of $4,000,000, which was
placed into another account (at one of the beneficiary "companies", C.T.C.).
This money remained intact. Later, the trustee made several subsequent
withdrawals from the G.T.C. account, the proceeds of which were dissipated.
This left just under $400,000 in the original mixed account.
Both beneficiaries, "the companies" and "the participants," each asserted
proprietary claims against these two amounts. What the court had to decide was
how these funds should be divided between the claimants, and upon what
principle this should be done.
At first instance, Parker A.C.J.H.C. held that the loss must at first be deemed to
be against the trustee's interest, on Re Hal/ett 's Estate reasoning. 13 This aspect
of the decision was not part of the appeal heard in the Supreme Court. Then,
Mr.Justice Parker decided that the funds should be divided according to the
respective contributions made by, or on behalf the two beneficiaries. This
meant that approximately 85 per cent of each fund belonged to the companies
and 15per cent to the participants.
The companies appealed from the original decision, claiming essentially that
they were entitled to the entirety of the larger sum (they conceded that they
were not entitled to any of the smaller sum, but the total on this basis still
worked out better for them). They claimed that the judge was mistaken in
basing the distribution on pro rata principles, when instead, the rule in
Clayton's case should have been applied. On the "first in, first out" reasoning,
the first moneys paid into the trustee's account at G.T.C. were those of the
companies, and subsequent deposits were those of the participants. Thus, when
the trustee removed the money from the G.T.C. Trust account, and deposited it
with C.T.C. (i.e. the large undissipated sum), the money concerned must
necessarily have been that of the companies. At first instance, Mr. Justice was
critical of Clayton's case, but the appellants challenged his decision basing
their action on both principle and authority.
The companies advanced an alternative pari passu argument. Their argument
was that the time from which the calculation of shares should start should be
earlier, since more money had originally been deposited by the companies into
the G.T.C. account, and that this also should be taken into account in any
distribution.
The participants insisted that the view of Mr.Justice Parker was correct, but
also advanced alternative arguments, with which the Ontario Court of Appeal
13 51 O.R. (2d) 212.
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was wholly unimpressed, that Clayton's case only applies to dissipations from
a mixed fund, not to investments made with money from it, and therefore that
the rule applied only after the removal of the $4 million to the C.T.C. account.14
The Court of Appeal adopted Mr.Justice Parker's approach, but rejecting the
companies' argument that the starting point should be earlier, since at the
earlier time there was no participants' money in the G.T.C. account, and that
therefore the participants should not be contaminated by anything that had
occurred at this time:
"The appellants submit that if the equality, that is, pro rata
sharing, approach is to be followed, then to do justice more money
furnished by the companies to the trustee than the ... balance of
December 15, 1982 [when the participants' money was paid in]
should be taken into account. ... If the proper approach is equality,
then, it is submitted, this fact [earlier payments in by the
companies] should be taken into account. ... Quite apart from the
fact that the question of whether any part of the original [money in
the account prior to December 15, 1982] ... was returned to the
companies in some form was not inquired into, I do not think that
this particular argument of the appellants is of assistance to them.
We are concerned with the resolution of competing proprietary,
not personal, claims. At the time of the mingling of the trust funds
the companies had $4,683,000 in the account. Regardless of how
much they had earlier in the account, they cannot say that they had
a proprietary interest in any more than the amount in the account
to their credit on and after December 15, 1982."15
Although the words "North American Rolling Charge" do not appear in the
judgments, the case is clearly based upon the concept, and justifies it.
To summarise, the main argument in favour of the North American Rolling
Charge is that it does not allow later dealings to affect already-established
property rights. However, in Re Ontario Securities, Mr.Justice Parker accepted
that there might be practical difficulties, in certain circumstances, in adopting
the rolling charge, in which case he made no observations on the appropriate
14 Supra.n.ll at 68Ih-682a.
15 Ibid. at 687f-688c.
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method of apportionment:
"I express no opinion on the power of the court to make a
disposition on some other basis where it is not possible to
determine what proportion the mixed funds bear each to the
other."16
The view of the Court of Appeal was that it would not apply Clayton's case at
all to the resolution of problems connected with competing beneficial
entitlements to a mingled trust fund, where there have been withdrawals from
the fund.
PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NORTH AMERICAN
ROLLING CHARGE
There are two further points to note about the North American Rolling
Charge, both of which may explain why it has rarely been argued in tlle United
Kingdom. First, it will not often be the best option of either party to any
dispute. In a case such as Barlow Clowes, for example, a pari passu distribution
would have produced a more favourable outcome than the North American
Rolling Charge for the early investors. By contrast, the later investors were
better off arguing Clayton's case than the North American Rolling Charge. This
will generally be the position where money is dissipated, whereas the North
American Rolling Charge tends towards an intermediate result. The opposite
position obtains where a valuable investment is purchased, where pari passu
benefits later investors, and Clayton's case earlier, and again the NOrtll
American Rolling Charge adopts a middle position.
For example, suppose a trustee places £10 belonging in equity to Paul into an
account, then a further £10 belonging to Michael, then dissipates £10, then
places in the account a further £20 belonging to Karen. There is therefore, at
this stage, £30 in the account, whereas a total of £40 has been paid in. Pari
passu therefore gives everybody three-quarters of their contribution, i.e. £7.50
to each of Paul and Michael, and £15 for Karen. It is worth observing that
Karen has lost out because of the withdrawal of £10, a transaction which
16 Quoted in ibid. at 679g.
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occurred before she had paid anything in, and in which she was therefore in no
sense involved.
Clayton's case attributes the whole of the £10 dissipated to the first payment
in, so that Paul ends up with nothing in the account, and Michael and Karen
recover the entirety of their contributions. This seems very unfair on Paul,
whose equity would seem to be in no way distinguishable from Michael's.
The North American Rolling Charge recognises that Paul's and Michael's
equities are equal, and apportions the £10 dissipated equally to the two of them.
Karen is unaffected by the £10 withdrawal, and the distribution is therefore £5
to each of Paul and Michael, and £20 to Karen.
In this case, nobody has a clear advantage in claiming under the North
American Rolling Charge, although Karen obtains the same by this method as
she would under Clayton's case. Paul obtains more under pari passu than under
the North American Rolling Charge, whereas Michael obtains more under
Clayton's case.
If instead of being dissipated, the £lOis spent on a first edition now worth
£50, the total value of the fund plus the investment is now £80, or twice the
contribution of each of the parties. Pari passu therefore gives each twice their
contribution, i.e. £20 for Paul and Michael, and £40 for Karen. This time,
Karen has gained the benefit of an investment to which she cannot have made
any meaningful contribution.
Clayton's case attributes the entirety of the investment to Paul, who can
therefore claim its value of £50, and the others obtain exactly their payments in,
i.e. £10 for Michael and £20 for Karen. Yet Paul's and Michael's equities
would again seem to be equal.
The North American Rolling Charge recognises this by attributing the
investment equally to Paul and Michael, giving each £25 in the investment plus
the £5 each has remaining in the account (i.e. a total value of £30 each). Karen
obtains her payment in, of £20, which is fair, because she has not contributed to
the investment.
Once again, it is in neither Paul nor Karen's interests to claim the North
American Rolling Charge method of distribution. Paul will attempt to argue
Clayton's case and Karen pari passu. However, it should not be assumed that
the North American Rolling Charge will never be the preferred method of
distribution, since clearly Michael should claim it here. Moreover, in the
original example, where the investment was purchased with Alpha's money,
the North American Rolling Charge would have been his choice method of
distribution, as indeed it also was for the participators in the Re Ontario
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Securities case. In general, however, it will rarely be the preferred method of
distribution for any of the parties, which may explain why it has never been
argued in a court in the United Kingdom.
The second observation to make on the North American Rolling Charge is
that it will never be the cheapest method of distribution. To operate a pari
passu distribution, the only information that is required is the total of payments
into the mixed account, and the total remaining. There is no need to trace the
individual movements within the account, so that where there are a large
number of transactions, as in Sinclair v. Brougham or Barlow Clowes, pari
passu will obviously be the easiest method. Where money from an account is
dissipated, the rule in Clayton's case removes from the account all earlier
deposits, so that it is not necessary to know about them, or about the total of
payments into the mixed account. There are some situations, therefore, where
pari passu is more difficult to operate than Clayton's case. Suppose, for
example, that a trustee has been paying money from various trust funds through
a mixed account over a long period. On a pari passu distribution, assuming the
fund has remained in credit, every contributor whose account is in credit will
have some claim on the fund. This would require all the account's dealings
over the entire period to be examined, and it is easy to conceive of
circumstances where this is impracticable. This is a possible justification for
applying Clayton's case to running bank accounts, 17 which has the effect of
depriving all but the latest depositors of any interest. Clayton's case operates
capriciously, however, and is difficult to justify except to resolve the
impracticality. 18
Where on the other hand, payments from a mixed account are committed to a
profitable investment, Clayton's case can also sometimes operate more simply
than pari passu, because any moneys paid in after the investment was made
will be discounted. Again, therefore, there is no need to enquire into these, or
into the total of payments into the account.
To operate the North American Rolling Charge, unless the account has at
some stage become overdrawn, it is necessary to examine the whole history of
17 E.g. in Re Diplock in respect of the Dr.Bamardo and the National Institute for the Deaf
accounts: supra. n.7.
18 The courts appear to adopt Clayton's case only as a last resort, and have shown
reluctance to extend its operation beyond running bank accounts; e.g., Barlow Clowes supra.n.l




the account, the amount of every payment in and out, and the order of
payments. This is always likely to be at least as difficult as either of the
alternative methods of distribution, and will often be more difficult.
CASES IN PRINCIPLE WHERE THE APPLICA nON OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN ROLLING CHARGE WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE
Although the North American Rolling Charge reaches the fairest result in
usual circumstances, it depends on the intention of the parties being that later
payments should not affect earlier established rights. However, where the
intention is to share a collective fund, the parties will intend that later payments
should affect earlier established rights, and pari passu distribution will accord
with this intention. This is a possible justification for the result in Barlow
Clowes, 19and will often be a reasonable inference in unincorporated
association cases. 20The intention of the parties was also regarded as
justification for departure from the North American Rolling Charge in Ontario
itself:
"Another exception, an obvious and necessary one, which might
often overlap with the kind of case just referred to, would be the
case where the court finds that the claimants have, either expressly
or by implication, agreed among themselves to a distribution based
otherwise than on a pro rata division following equitable tracing
of contributions."21
19 Indeed, this was expressly the basis of Dillon and Leggatt L.JJ.'s reasoning in the case.
Woolf L.J.'s reasoning was based more generally on the intention of the parties, but again
depends on the notion of the parties contributing to a common misfortune, so that they would not
want to 'subject what was left of the pool to the vagaries of chance which would follow from the
first in first out principle' supra.n.1 at 41e-h. The reasoning was directed primarily to a refusal
to apply Clayton's case, but it would have been equally apposite in an argument against the
application of a North American Rolling Charge.
20 It might also justify the pari passu distribution in Sinclair v. Brougham supra.n. 7, at
least as far as the building society investments were concerned. The usual presumption for
unincorporated associations is equality, rather than pari passu distribution, Re Hobo.urn Aero
Components Air Raid Distress Fund [1946] Ch.86, affirmed on other grounds [1946] Ch.194,
which adopted pari passu, being an exceptional case.
21 Supra.n.ll at 690e.
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Another departure from the North American Rolling Charge (or indeed, any of
the approaches considered so far) was made by Mr.Justice Millett in El Ajou v.
Dollar Land Holdings p.l. c.. 22Here, while it was clear that the plaintiff was the
principal victim of a complicated fraud, and that the defendant's only money
appeared to have come from the proceeds of the fraud, the records of
transactions had not been fastidiously kept, the fraudsters presumably being
motivated to hide their fraud, and frustrate tracing claims. Clearly, it would
have been impossible to apply either Clayton's case or the North American
Rolling Charge, given this paucity of evidence. Possibly, had Mr.Justice Millett
had the benefit of the Barlow Clowes decision, which had not at that time been
reported,23 he would have adopted a pari passu approach. Instead, however, he
matched large cheques from the plaintiff into a running account with similar-
sized cheques out of it, in order to establish that the defendant had received
money belonging in equity to the plaintiff. 24 This might be justified if the
similarity between the cheques in and out gave rise to the inference that the
plaintiffs money was never truly mixed into the running account.25
Although Mr.Justice Millett held that the money could be traced into the
hands of the defendant, he also held that the defendant did not have the
requisite knowledge for a knowing receipt claim. His decision in this respect
was reversed by the Court of Appeal, 26who sent it back on quantum. In El Ajou
v. Dollar Land Holdings p.l.c. (No.2), Mr.Justice Robert Walker took the view
that where there are no competing proprietary claims, and all that is desired is
to trace the plaintiffs property into the hands of the defendant for the purposes
of establishing a knowing receipt claim, it is unnecessary to apportion
22 [1993] 3 All E.R. 717.
23 As Robert Walker 1. observed inEI Ajou v. Dollar LandHoldings p.l.e. (No.2) [1995]
2 All E.R. 213 at 222f.
24 E.g. supra.n.22 at 724j-725e, although the matching was not exact. The claim was in
knowing receipt, not tracing: see further infra.n.26 & text.
25 Although Millett 1. appears to have proceeded on the assumption that it was: supra.n.22
at 724h. But the suggested inference is reasonable, whereas if the money had been truly mixed,
then it is difficult, on any known principle, to justify Millett 1.'s method of calculating the
amount the defendant had received of money belonging to the plaintiff.
26 [1994] 2 All E.R. 685.
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competing claims at all. 27 His desired result appears to have been to ensure that
the defendant obtained no benefit from the fraud, although there were other
claims, apart from the plaintiff's, when it looked unlikely that any of the other
claimants would sue. However, this distinction between apportioning for
proprietary, but not for personal claims, can lead to difficulties in practice.2&
Suppose, for example, any of the others, contrary to expectation, had sued.
Either the defendant would be liable for more than he had received, or it would
be necessary to resolve the problem on an arbitrary first come first served basis.
There is also a principled objection to Mr.Justice Robert Walker's approach,
which is that although the defendant had apparently received a large amount of
money from the proceeds of fraud, not all of it was from a fraud on the
plaintiff. If fraud victims, for whatever reason, decide not to sue, then it is an
inevitable consequence that the fraudster will keep some of his ill-gotten gains.
That is simply the nature of litigation, and is not a consequence that can be
avoided. It is therefore contended that an apportionment should have taken
place in EI.Jljou (No.2), on the principles discussed in this article.
In this section, however, two situations where the North American Rolling
Charge would be inappropriate have been considered, namely where the
investment is into a common fund, as in Barlow Clowes, and where the money
is never truly mixed, which is a possible explanation of Mr.Justice Millett's
approach in El Ajou. In any case where justification from the North American
Rolling Charge can be made out in principle, the justification is in favour of
pari passu, or an entirely different tracing principle, such as that adopted inEI
Ajou, rather than Clayton's case. The only justification for adopting the rule in
Clayton's case is one of administrative workability, especially in the case of a
running bank account, where both pari passu and the North American Rolling
Charge would be difficult to operate, in the first case because it is difficult to
apportion where there have been many payments into and out of a fund over
many years, and in the second case because for the same reason, it is difficult to
apportion payments out.
Therefore administrative workability arguments are considered next.
27 Supra. n.23.
28 It is not sufficient, as Robert Walker 1. does, ibid. at 223c, to justify the result on the
basis that tracing depends on equity's capacity to impose a charge, rather than its actual
imposition, because if the other parties had sued it would have been necessary actually to
determine the extent of each charge.
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ADMINISTRATIVE WORKABILITY ARGUMENTS
It is easy to see how, in the case of a long-term active running account, from
which money is frequently dispersed, Clayton's case is the easiest test to
administer, because the earliest payments in are simply removed from the
equation. It might be thought that in the usual case, the North American Rolling
Charge will also be easier to administer than pari passu (at least where there
are dissipations) because each withdrawal reduces the number of claimants, so
the earliest depositors will be ruled out just as they are with Clayton's case.
This is only actually going to be the case, however, if the earlier dissipations
are such as to reduce some claims to zero, but in principle, both pari passu and
the North American Rolling Charge require the entire history of the bank
account to be known.
However, pari passu is itself sometimes justified on the grounds that it is
easier than either of the other two methods to administer, 29 and indeed, there are
exceptional cases where this will be true. In Barlow Clowes and El Ajou, for
example, the total investment, and the total remaining in fund, were both
known, but in El Ajou, inadequate records had been kept, and there was an
inadequate trail, which would have made either of the other methods
impossible. In Barlow Clowes there were a large number of transactions, which
would have made either of the other methods difficult, but not impossible. 30 It
is suggested, however, that neither of these cases represents a good ground for
departing from the North American Rolling Charge.
In a case such as El Ajou, it would clearly be inappropriate, on public policy
grounds, to develop a rule which encouraged fraudsters to keep inadequate (or
no) records, or allowed them to benefit from so doing. It was pretty clear in El
Ajou that the only money the Canadians had was derived from the frauds
considered in the case, so to distribute pari passu would have been to deprive
the fraudsters of any of their gain, whereas this would not have been the case
had every individual claimant been required to prove his or her entitlement on a
29 E.g. Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cork Report,
Cmnd. 8558, H.M.S.O., 1982) paras. 1076-1080; Barlow Clowes, where cost was one of the
reasons why none of the parties argued for a North American Rolling Charge distribution:
supra.n.l at 28b per Dillon L.J., at 35jper WoolfL.J.
30 Per WoolfL.J. supra.n.l at 35j (on the North American Rolling Charge). Pari passu
would also have been easiest to apply in Hobourn Aero supra.n.20 where like Barlow Clowes
the total investment and total fund remaining were both known.
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rolling charge basis. However, this problem is easily resolved by evidence
presumptions. If in the absence of contrary evidence, payments in and out are
considered to be simultaneous, then there will be a pari passu result. Only if
there is contrary evidence will this presumption be displaced, and the sensible
solution would therefore seem to be simply to place the burden of proof on the
party claiming that the transactions occurred in a particular order.
The problem in Barlow Clowes is different, because in principle, it would
have been possible to apply either of the other two tests. It would, however,
have been expensive, and indeed the cost might have been so great as seriously
to dissipate what remained in the fund. This will not always be the case in the
silicon age, as Mr.Justice Parker observed in the Ontario case:
"The application of the general equitable rules of tracing refelTed
to supra is both logical and fair. In this age of computerized
banking, it can hardly be argued that in most instances an
application of such principles will cause much inconvenience,
difficulty or complication. These same principles are often applied
to quite complicated dealings which do not involve bank
accounts. "31
The general rules of tracing to which he was referring were, in effect, the North
American Rolling Charge. 32 This case is over a decade old, and it is reasonable
to suppose that computerised banking has made the necessary calculations
easier in the meantime. However, it is accepted that there may still be some
cases, such as Barlow Clowes, where the number of transactions is very large,
where expense may still be a major issue.
It has already been suggested that on other grounds, pari passu distribution
was the most appropriate solution in Barlow Clowes, but if there had been no
intention to form a common fund, it is felt that the expense arguments would
not have justified departure from the North American Rolling Charge. In the
first place, there is the problem of deciding at what stage the departure should
be made, especially given that such departure might affect already-established
rights. It is suggested, however, that there is no need to invoke a special rule to
31 51 O.R. (2d) 212 at 239-240, quoted in (1986) 55 O.R. (2d) 673 at 679h (Ont.C.A.).
32 Although the expression "North American Rolling Charge" is never actually used in
the case.
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deal with this situation. If the cost of applying a particular method of
distribution becomes so great as to dissipate a large part of the fund, it is clearly
in the interests of all the parties to agree to some simpler form of settlement. In
principle, this is no different from any other kind of litigation over limited
funds. If one party can still see a clear gain from the application of the North
American Rolling Charge, then it is for that party to bring the case, with the
attendant litigation risks and costs.
There are, in any case, problems with basing a legal rule on the comparative
costs of distribution methods, since especially in the age of computerised
banking, these comparative costs can alter. It would be absurd to set in stone a
particular distribution method, on the basis of comparative costs, when these
could quickly go out of date. It is even possible to envisage situations where the
difficulty and/or expense increases or decreases during the proceedings,
perhaps because a cheaper method is developed of getting data into electronic
form, or the only witness of fact dies, or records are destroyed. It would be
absurd to alter the distribution method, thereby affecting established property
rights. Once it is accepted that this cost is, in principle, no different from any
other litigation cost, then these problems disappear.
AUTHORITY
Argument has been made so far for the general adoption of the North
American Rolling Charge except in cases where it would be inappropriate, for
example, where the parties are contributing to a common fund. If the
applicability of Clayton's case is resolved in the House of Lords, as Lord
Justice Woolf suggested in Barlow Clowes, 33 then previous authority would not
impede the development of the law, but in the meantime it is necessary to
examine the authorities against the proposition for which argument is made.
Despite Lord Justice Dillon's view in Barlow Clowes that there was clear
authority against the adoption of the North American Rolling Charge, 34 it is
suggested that such authority as there is unconvincing.
There are a number of authorities for a pari passu method of distribution, but
none of these is conclusive against the North American Rolling Charge,





have been the same even if the North American Rolling Charge method had
been used, or the case falls within one of the exceptions for which we have
already argued. In Sine/airv. Brougham, the House of Lords held that a fund
consisting a building society and ultra vires banking investments be held on a
pari passu basis, and there is no doubt that a North American Rolling Charge
basis of distribution would have led to a different result, except in the unlikely
event that all investments were made simultaneously. However, it has already
been suggested that at least for the building society shares, a pari passu
distribution was probably justified as a common investment, and this may also
vindicate its use in the distribution of the ultra vires banking investments. In
any case, however, the House seemed concerned only to ascertain the
respective distributions as between the two classes of investor, rather than
determine individual entitlements, since the order was made subject to any
individual tracing claim that may have been made. 35 Sinclair is therefore not
authority against the applicability in English law of the North American
Rolling Charge.
There was also a pari passu distribution in Re Diplock, except for the running
bank accounts, but Diplock also is not a strong authority against the North
American Rolling Charge, because there was only one Diplock investment into
each fund, and therefore the result would have been the same had the North
American Rolling Charge method been adopted; In Bar/ow Clowes, pari passu
was used, and the North American Rolling Charge method was considered too
difficult to apply, but the ratio of the case is probably confined to common
investment funds. 36 Certainly, Lord Justice Dillon would not have applied pari
passu except to a common investment, but it is also worth observing that none
of the parties advanced a North American Rolling Charge argument. The
debate was therefore confined to the relative merits of pari passu against
Clayton's case, and the opportunity to consider serious arguments for the North
American Rolling Charge did not arise.37
It is contended that Clayton's case ought never to be applicable to the
resolution of competing equitable property interests. Clayton's case itself
concerned the allocation of legal choses in action to amounts of money in a
35 On this point alone the case was overruled in Westdeutsche supra.n. 7.
36 Supra.n.19.
37 Dillon L.J. also thought that the North American Rolling Charge was ruled out on the
grounds of authority, and in particular the cases discussed in the following paragraph: supra.n.9.
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bank account. The dispute was between banker and customer, and in this
particular context, as a rule of convenience based on implied intention it was
probably justified. McConville has argued strongly that there is no justification
for applying Clayton's case beyond that context, 38 but in Pennell v. Deffell,39
the principles from the case were extended to the distribution of competing
proprietary claims to money in a bank account. The case is a weak authority,
however, because as between beneficiaries and trustee the case was overruled
in Re Hallett's Estate, 40 and as between the beneficiaries themselves there was
enough to go around anyway. In Re Diplock, Clayton's case was used, as part
of the ratio, in respect of the Dr. Barnan:io and National Institute for the Deaf
funds, but unenthusiastically, since the main purport of Re Diplock is to apply
pari passu where the equities are equal. 41 Clayton 's case was applied only to
running bank accounts, as a rule of convenience, and was said to be based on
implied intention, which of course is rebuttable. It is also unlikely that anybody
had even thought of the concept of the North American Rolling Charge by the
time of the decision, let alone of applying it. It is argued, therefore, that the
authority is not strong, but it was used by Lord Justice Dillon in Barlow Clowes
as Court of Appeal authority for the rejection of the North American Rolling
Charge. It is difficult, however, to justify Clayton's case on the basis of implied
intention in Re Diplock, since the next-of-kin and the charity had never had any
contact with each other; indeed, the charity was unaware of the existence of the
next-of-kin. Clearly, therefore, there was no common intention, and since the
next-of-kin was unaware of the destination of the money, their intention cannot
have been relevant. The only intention therefore which can be relevant is that of
the charity, the volunteer who does the mixing, and it is suggested that to found
a principle on the basis of the intention of the volunteer recipient is absurd.
It can be concluded that there is no convincing authority against the
development of the North American Rolling Charge, but that in so far that it is
ruled out by any statements made in Re Diplock, those statements should be
regarded as wrong. In Bar/ow Clowes, only Lord Justice Dillon perceived that
the North American Rolling Charge had been ruled out by authority; Lord
38 D.A. McConville, "Tracing and the Rule in Clayton's Case" (1963) 79 L.Q.R. 388.
39 (1853) 4 De G.M. & G. 372,43 E.R. 551.
40 Supra.n.5.
41 Supra. n. 7 & text, & n.17 & text.
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Justices Woolf and Leggatt would both have been prepared to apply it had they
considered it appropriate in the circumstances.
It is suggested, therefore, that even in the absence of a decision of the House
of Lords reconsidering Clayton's case, the courts could adopt the principles
which have been argued for in this article.
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